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Summary findings
The link between pension reform and capital market  fulfill the second requirement. The main impact
development has become a perennial question, raised  preconditions include the attainment of critical mass; the
every time the potential benefits and preconditions of  adoption of conducive regulations, especially on pension
pension reform are discussed. Vittas asks two questions.  fund investments; the pursuit of optimizing policies by
First, what are the basic "feasibility" preconditions  for  the pension funds; and a prevalence of pluralistic
the successful launch of a pension reform program? And  structures.
second, what are the necessary "impact" preconditions  Vittas also argues that pension funds are neither
for the realization of the potential benefits of funded  necessary nor sufficient for capital market development.
pension plans for capital market development?  Other forces, such as advances in technology,
His main conclusion is that the feasibility  deregulation, privatization, foreign direct investment,
preconditions are not as demanding as is sometimes  and especially regional and global economic integration,
assumed. In contrast, the impact preconditions are more  may be equally important. But pension funds are critical
onerous. The most important feasibility precondition is a  players in "symbiotic" finance, the simultaneous and
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maintaining macroeconomic and financial stability,  elements of modern financial systems. They can support
fostering a small core of solvent and efficient banks and  the development of factoring, leasing, and venture
insurance companies, and creating an effective regulatory  capital companies, all of which specialize in financing
and supervisory agency. Opening the domestic banking  new and expanding small firms.
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i1.  Introduction
The link between pension reform and capital market development has become a
perennial question that is raised every time the potential benefits and preconditions of
pension reform are discussed. The creation of funded pension plans has major long-term
implications for the functioning and growth of financial markets. The steady
accumulation of long-term financial resources, which is a basic feature of funded
pension plans, is bound to affect the composition of financial savings, even if it may not
affect the rate of national saving. The very accumulation of these long-term resources
raises the question of what preconditions must the financial system of a country fulfill in
order to enable their efficient utilization and the achievement of the basic objectives of
pension reform.
This paper' addresses these issues from two perspectives: first, it asks what are
the minimum preconditions of financial sector development for the success of pension
reform and the promotion of funded pension plans. These are described as "feasibility"
preconditions. Then it asks what preconditions are necessary for allowing the pension
funds to realize their potential impact on capital market development. These are
described as "impact" preconditions.
The main conclusion of the paper is that the "feasibility" preconditions are not as
demanding as it is sometimes assumed. In contrast, the "impact" preconditions are more
onerous. The most important "feasibility" precondition is a strong and lasting
commitment of the authorities to maintain macrofinancial stability, to foster a small core
of solvent and efficient banks and insurance companies, and to create an effective
regulatory and supervisory agency. Opening the domestic banking and insurance
markets to foreign participation can easily fulfill the second requirement.  The main
"impact" preconditions include the attainment of critical mass, the adoption of
conducive regulations, the pursuit of optimizing policies, and the prevalence of
pluralistic structures.
The paper discusses the various preconditions in turn and provides country
examples from different regions of the world that underscore the relevance of these
preconditions. It also emphasizes the importance of a strong and long-term commitment
by the authorities, not only in implementing pension reform but also in pursuing all the
necessary capital market reforms. Before addressing these issues, a number of
preliminary observations are made to put the question of pension reform and its links
with capital market development into a more appropriate context.
I  The paper is a continuation  and expansion  of earlier  work on the links  between  pension  reform
and capital markets.  It draws heavily  on Vittas  (1998b  and 1999).
12.  Objectives  of Pension  Reform
The first preliminary  observation  concerns  the objectives  of pension  reform.  It is
always  important  to emphasize  that despite  the broader  potential  benefits in higher
efficiency  and economic  growth  that may ensue,  the development  of financial  markets  is
not, and should  not be, the primary  objective  of pension  reform.  Rather  the basic
objective  of pension  reform  and, the raison d'etre of pension  systems,  is the provision  of
adequate,  affordable  and sustainable  benefits.  Achievement  of this objective,  and the
role that funded and privately  managed  pension  plans can play in this, have far-reaching
implications  for the efficiency  of financial  markets.  But these are side effects.  They are
highly welcome  because of their beneficial  impact  on growth  and development,  but they
do not constitute  the primary reason  for pension  reform.
The second objective  is the creation  of a strong  link between contributions  and
benefits  in order to minimize  any incentive  distortions  on the functioning  of labor
markets  and avoid capricious  and  perverse  redistribution  caused  by volatile inflation  and
inconsistent  eligibility  requirements.  Attainment  of this objective  does not require the
creation  of funded  plans but only the institution  of defined-contribution  plans  or the use
of lifetime  earnings, less backloaded  benefits,  and full vesting  and portability  rights in
the case  of defined-benefit  plans.
The third objective  is the generation  of long-term  savings  that would  help
stimulate  the development  of capital  markets.  It is often argued  that use of funded
pension  plans would increase  the rate  of saving  in a country.  Although  this is possible
under  certain  conditions,  it is by no means  certain.  But there is little doubt that the
creation  of funded  pension  plans changes  the composition  of financial  assets and
increases  the supply  of long-term  contractual  savings.
Pension  reform can take three different  forms:  parametric,  NDC, and systemic.
Parametric  reforms,  such as increasing  the normal  retirement  age, tightening  conditions
for early retirement  and disability  pensions,  lowering  benefit rates, raising  payroll  taxes,
combating  evasion,  and enhancing  the administrative  efficiency  of social security
institutions,  aim at preventing  the financial  collapse  of traditional  unfunded  social
security  systems.  They deal with fiscal imbalances  but they do not address  the
distortions  in economic  incentives  that characterize  systems  with weak links between
contributions  and benefits.
Reforms  based on notional  defined  contribution  (NDC)  plans aim at eliminating
the labor  market distortions  that result from high evasion  and the growth of informal
labor markets.  NDC reforms  link benefits  to contributions  and weaken  the incentives  for
evasion  and strategic  manipulation  that bedevil  unfunded  defined-benefit  plans. By
reducing  the size of the informal  labor  market,  NDC reforms  raise labor  productivity  and
lead to higher economic  growth.
Neither  pararnetric  nor NDC reforms  generate  long-term  savings  or have any
direct  effect on the development  of financial  markets.  Only systemic  reforms  that
2involve  the creation  of funded pension  plans have such  effects.  To the extent that better
developed  banking  and securities  markets  make an independent  and additional
contribution  to higher economic  growth  (Demirguc-Kunt  and Levine 1996,  Levine and
Zervos 1998),  then only systemic  reforms  would accelerate  economic  growth  beyond
what could be achieved  by reducing  the size of the informal  labor  market.
3.  "Short-Cuts" and "Long-Cuts"  in Development
The second  preliminary  observation  concerns  the use of "short-cuts"  in
development.  A long-held  view by Millard  Long,  the Director  of the 1989  World
Development  Report  on "Financial  Systems  and Development"  (World  Bank 1989) is
that there are no "short-cuts"  in development 2. There are several  examples  of futile
attempts  to accelerate  the pace of economic  development  through  the adoption  of some
simple solutions  that pay little attention  to the institutional  capabilities  of low-income
countries.  Adoption  of "best  practice"  is often advocated  without  the realization
that if developing countries could implement "best practice" they would not be
"developing".
Traditional  examples  of such "short-cut"  solutions  in development  include  the
establishment  of development  banks,  the imposition  of directed  credit  programs  on
commercial  banks and the use of prescribed  asset ratios  on insurance  companies  and
pension  funds.  In most cases, these approaches  created  "captive  funds" for financing
large budget  deficits,  for supporting  "white elephant"  projects,  and for favoring
privileged  groups  of borrowers,  without any sustainable  positive effects  on economic
growth  and development.  There are some  exceptions  to this pattern  but they involve
countries  that emphasized  the importance  of institutional  development  and monitoring
capabilities.  By and large, however,  these solutions  have  ended in failure.
More recent examples  include  the use of privatization  vouchers  in the Czech
Republic  and other  transition  countries  where  the intention  was apparently  the overnight
creation  of large capital  markets with thousands  of listed companies  and millions  of
personal  shareholders.  This was probably  the "shortest"  of all "short-cuts".  It should  not
be surprising  that without  effective  and robust  institutions,  including  capital  market
regulatory  agencies,  the various initiatives  ended  in extensive  asset stripping  and looting
of privatized  companies  and the enrichment  of few "entrepreneurs"  at the expense  of the
masses of individual  investors  (World  Bank 1999,  Coffee 1999).
Another  example  is the transfer  of state-owned  but "privatizable"  assets to social
security  institutions.  This aims at transforming  unfunded  institutions  with high implicit
2  This  is not to deny that some policies  may  promote  development.  Policies  that ensure
macroeconomic  stability,  introduce  incentives  for sound finance  and focus  on institution  building  are
likely  to have an important  and lasting  effect on accelerating  development.  These are long-term  solutions
that  treat development  as a process  that is likely  to suffer  setbacks.  They  require patience  and
perseverance  and cannot  be described  as short  cuts.
3debts into partially funded ones. But it is often undertaken without paying adequate
attention to the lack of investment expertise at the receiving institutions and the absence
of mechanisms that would insulate the management of these assets from political
interference. It is an example of reforms that aim to achieve some elusive "synergy" but
often end in suffering from "dysergy'3.
The reliance on international financial flows is a further example of a "short-cut"
in development since these flows proved to be affected by the volatile sentiment of
international fund managers. "Contagion" effects have been documented not only in the
case of hedge funds and large pension funds and insurance companies but also in the
case of mutual funds. Past research tended to show that international mutual funds did
not exacerbate financial crises in developing countries. But recent research (Kaminsky et
al 1999) shows that both individual investors and fund managers of US mutual funds
that invest in Latin America reacted in an indiscriminate way after the Russian crisis of
August 1998. The findings of this study highlight the importance of large domestic
institutional investors for greater market stability and lower price volatility in emerging
markets. The greater insulation of the Chilean and South African equity markets from
the adverse impact of the international financial crisis of 1998, which is attributed, at
least in part, to the strong presence of domestic institutional investors, provides
additional support to this thesis.
Developing pension funds and other domestic institutional investors is in many
respects the "longest" of "long-cuts" and requires patience and long-term commitment.
Another recent World Bank research project points to a strong link between contractual
savings (comprising the assets of both pension funds and life insurance companies) and
equity market development (measured either by the value of trading or by market
capitalization) 4. It also shows that a strong presence of domestic institutional investors
reduces price volatility.
Rather interestingly, the sample of OECD countries on which the research is
based includes a number of countries where pension funds and insurance companies,
though very large in aggregate, follow conservative investment policies and neither
invest nor trade heavily in equities (e.g. Switzerland and the Netherlands). This suggests
that contractual savings may have a direct as well as an indirect impact on capital market
development. The latter probably stems from the greater attractiveness of capital
markets for international investors in countries where contractual savings are large,
prospective deficits of public pension schemes are small, and governments are able to
finance their long-term borrowing needs by issuing bonds and without recourse to
inflationary short-term borrowing from commercial banks. Testing of this possibility
would require separate data on holdings and trading by foreign institutional investors.
3  "Dysergy"  is a tern coined  by the author  to describe  the result  of complex  and over-ambitious
reforms  that  aim  at simultaneously  achieving  several  objectives  but end up in frustration  and little
implementation  as delays  in one area  block action  in all.
4  This  research,  undertaken  by Alberto  Musalem,  has not yet been completed  but preliminary
findings  underscore  the link  between  contractual  savings  and equity  markets.
4But as argued  below,  the role of international  investors  appears  to be very important  in
some  non-OECD  countries  such as Singapore  and Malaysia.
4.  Financial Market Benefits of Systemic Pension Reform
The third preliminary  observation  concerns  the financial  market  benefits  of
systemic  pension  reform.  Pension  funds  and other institutional  investors  entail
substantial  long-term  benefits  for the development  of financial  markets.  Because  of their
long-term  orientation  and their special financial  needs  and also because  they are
managed  by professional  investors,  they have the potential  to:
*  act as a countervailing  force  to existing commercial  and investment  banks;
*  stimulate  financial  innovation;
*  exert  pressure  for greater  market integrity  and modernized  trading facilities;
*  strengthen  corporate  governance;  and
*  encourage  more  robust  financial  regulation  with positive demonstration  effects
for other  financial  sectors,  such as banking and insurance 5.
Countervailing  Force. One of the main potential  benefits  of the growth  of
institutional  investors  is the intensification  of competition  in the financial  system. The
development  of new sources  of finance  forces dominant  commercial  banks  to become
more competitive  and to start  seeking  out their customers  rather than waiting  for
prospective  borrowers  to visit them. The development  of institutional  investors  also
contributes  to more  competitive  investment  banking  and securities  markets  (e.g.
competitive  bidding  for corporate  issues, lower  issuing and trading  costs, etc.).
Financial  Innovation. Institutional  investors,  and especially  pension  funds, were
major forces stimulating  the financial  innovation  that has.  taken place  over the past forty
years (Bodie 1990). Directly  or indirectly,  they supported  the development  of asset-
backed  securities,  the use of structured  finance and derivative  products,  the launching  of
index-tracking  funds, and  the offer of synthetic  products  that protect investors  from
market declines.  Financial  innovation  stemming  from institutional  investors  is also
evident in those  developing  countries  that have implemented  systemic  pension  reform,
such as Chile and Argentina  (Diamond  and Valdes-Prieto  1994, Walker  and Lefort
1999).
Market  Integrity. Institutional  investors,  which are managed  by trained
professionals,  are usually  more  aware than ordinary  investors  of the potential  conflicts
of interest and agency  problems  facing  corporate  management.  Institutional  investors
also have  more clout and are thus better able  to insist on investor  protection  legislation
that will ensure  market integrity.  Investor  protection  rules are generally  better developed
5  The capital  market  effects  of contractual  savings  and institutional  investors  are discussed  in
greater  detail in Vittas (I  998b and 1999).  See  also Walker and Lefort  (1999) for an empirical  study of the
impact  of pension  funds on capital  market  development  in Latin America.
5in countries where large institutional investors hold diversified minority positions in a
large number of companies than in countries where institutional investors are either
underdeveloped (e.g. Germany) or tend to hold large controlling positions in a small
number of companies (e.g. South Africa).  At the same time, a stronger legal protection
of minority shareholder rights may have contributed to the earlier and on a larger scale
diversification into equities of institutional investors in Anglo-American countries
compared to continental European countries.
Modernization  of Market Trading.  Institutional investors may also exert
considerable pressure for modem and efficient trading, clearing and settlement facilities.
In the United States and other countries, they have encouraged the use of bloc trading,
the abolition of minimum commissions, the restructuring of stock markets and the
automation of trading facilities.  They have also played an important part in promoting
more efficient clearing facilities and establishing central depositary agencies that
facilitate the move to book-entry systems and provide safekeeping services.  And they
have exerted pressure for modem efficient and reliable back-office operations that have
suffered in all countries with emerging securities markets as existing facilities could not
cope with fast growing trading volumnes 6.
Corporate Governance.  The role of institutional investors in corporate
governance has evolved in line with their growing importance as corporate owners. As
long as their equity holdings were small and diversified in a large number of cormpanies
and as long as they represented a small fraction of market capitalization, institutional
investors adopted a passive approach to corporate governance.  They tended to vote with
management and if they were unhappy with corporate performance, they could sell
without suffering a big fall in market price.
But with continuing growth in their accumulated assets, institutional investors
have collectively become dominant share:iolders of many nonfinancial corporations. As a
result, they can no longer exercise the "exit" option without disrupting the market and
suffering big falls in market prices. They are effectively forced to exercise "voice".
Institutional investors, mostly through various cc"' ctive bodies, have been instrumental in
emphasizing the importance of strengthening corporate governance structures and
especially of increasing the accountability of top managers.
Financial Regulation.  The development of institutional investors requires a
robust and effective regulatory and supervisory framnework.  This takes time to develop
and requires a strong and lasting commitment by the authorities. Although stringent
regulations may be imposed at first, especially if a compulsory pension and insurance
system is created, over time regulations need to be relaxed and to emphasize transparency
and prudence as well as the fiduciary duty of managers toward investors (Vittas 1998a).
6  In many countries  around  the world  that  do not have the size and depth of US markets,
modernization  initiatives  have  been undertaken  in response  to growing  interest by international  investors,
often  the very  same institutional  investors  that  promoted  the modernization  of US and UK  markets.  As
discussed  below,  growing  international  integration  is another  major factor  promoting  capital market
development.
6In developing  countries  with  weak  regulatory  structures,  a long-term  benefit  of creating
private  pension  funds  may  well  be the establishment  of new and  robust  regulatory
agencies  that  have a strong  positive  demonstration  effect  on other  segments  of the
financial  system.
5.  "Feasibility" Preconditions
Much attention  has been  paid over the years  to the presence  or absence  of
"feasibility"  preconditions.  The absence  of well-developed  financial  markets  has been a
traditional  argument  against  the creation  of funded  pension  plans.  As argued  elsewhere
(Vittas  1998b),  this view is shortsighted  and ignores  the dynamic  interaction  that is
likely  to develop  between  pension  funds and  capital  markets 7.
In fact, the "feasibility"  preconditions  for successful  implementation  of pension
reform  are not as demanding  as it is sometimes  assumed.  The gradual  accumulation  of
pension  fund assets  provides  ample  time for the fulfillment  of these preconditions.  The
most important  "feasibility"  precondition  is a strong  and lasting  commitment  of the
authorities  to maintain  macrofinancial  stability,  to foster  a small core  of solvent  and
efficient  banks and insurance  companies,  and to create an effective  regulatory  and
supervisory  agency.
Macrostability.  Macroeconomic  stability  and low inflation  are essential  because
neither  the securities  markets nor institutional  investors  can function  efficiently  under
high and volatile  inflation. Although  the use of inflation-indexed  instruments  may
mitigate  the problems  caused  by moderate  inflation,  any indexation  mechanism  would
tend  to break  down  in the presence  of high and accelerating  inflation.  The experience  of
Brazil  in the 1980s  has shown  that inflation-indexed  instruments  provide  little protection
in periods  of hyperinflation.  With the acceleration  of inflation,  price adjustments  must
be effected  at shorter  and shorter  intervals,  otherwise  the holders  of indexed  financial
instruments  suffer large losses  from the erosion  of the real value of their assets.
Broad  fiscal  balance is also important  because  it is usually  the single  most
important  source  of high and accelerating  inflation. Governments  with large, persistent
and growing  budget  deficits are unable  to finance  them by borrowing  and issuing  new
bonds and are forced to monetize  their debt,  fiuelling  and exacerbating  the inflationary
process.
One difficulty  posed by the presence  of large  budget  deficits  is that systemic
pension  reform  usually  entails an increase  in the deficit of the public  pension  (social
security)  system  during  the transition  period.  This is because  pension  payments  to
current  pensioners  will continue  to be made,  while some  of the payroll  taxes  from active
workers  will be diverted  to the new funded  pillar.  This is why several  European
7  According  to Walker  and Lefort  (1999),  this point  is also  underscored  by Valdes-Prieto  and
Cifuentes  (1990).
7countries that are faced with large pension expenditures are forced to adopt a gradual
process in their pension reform programs. Countries like Sweden, Italy, France, and
Slovenia are forced to undertake parametric or, at best, NDC reforms before they are in a
position to implement a systemic pension reform program.
Sound Banks and Insurance Companies. The second "feasibility" precondition
is the presence of a core of sound and efficient institutions. Many developing countries
have financial systems that are dominated by insolvent and inefficient banks, often
owned by the state or by large private groups. Insurance sectors are even less developed,
are dominated by inefficient state monopolies or under-capitalized and under-reserved
private companies, and operate under repressive regulations that inhibit competition,
innovation and efficiency.
In most developing countries, the problems posed by the underdevelopment of
banks and insurance companies can be resolved by opening the market to foreign
institutions. Although they tend to engage in some "cream skimming" by focusing on
the more profitable and attractive segments of the market, foreign banks and insurance
companies bring many benefits to the local markets through the transfer of financial
technology and know-how, the training of managerial and other staff, and the adoption
of sound business practices. In most reforming countries in Latin America and Eastern
Europe, foreign banks and insurance companies play a leading part in the private pillar
of the new multi-pillar pension systems, often in joint ventures with large local groups.
A core of sound and efficient banks and insurance companies is important for the
handling of contributions and other payments, for the maintenance of individual records
and accounts, for the provision of robust and efficient custodial services, and for the
offer of reliable insurance contracts, especially with regard to term life and disability
insurance. Custodial services are particularly important because they require
sophisticated computer systems, efficient record-keeping and reporting facilities, and
large financial resources.
Effective Regulation and Supervision. The third "feasibility" precondition
concerns the creation of an effective regulatory and supervisory agency. Again, the main
need is for a firm and lasting commitment for the creation of a sound and robust
regulatory framework, not the prior existence of a strong agency. The tasks of the new
agency would initially be limited to vetting applications and ensuring that only qualified
institutions obtain licenses to operate pension funds. Over time the regulatory agency
must develop all its other functions, including the creation of a strong capability in
undertaking off-site surveillance and conducting on-site inspections. Taking timely
intervention action in cases of potential default and serious violations of regulations is
also very important. Under the modern approach to financial regulation, the new agency
will most likely use the services of external private sector actuaries, accountants,
auditors, and custodians for furthering its work. Relying on international expertise
provided by foreign regulatory agencies and international consulting firms will also
contribute to the effective discharge of its functions.
86.  "Impact"  Preconditions
Pension funds and other institutional investors have potentially large benefits for
the development of financial markets. These benefits are not, however, automatic but
depend on a number of "impact" preconditions. These include the attainment of critical
mass, the adoption of conducive regulations, the pursuit of optimizing policies, and the
prevalence of pluralistic structures. In many respects, fulfillment of these "impact"
preconditions is much more onerous and challenging than fulfillment of the basic
"feasibility" preconditions. This is because the "impact" preconditions rely on the long-
term success of the pension reform program and the implementation of far-reaching
reforms in most other segments of the financial system.
Attainment of critical mass. Critical mass is difficult to define with any degree
of precision. In general, it is unlikely to be attained until pension funds and other
institutional investors command resources corresponding to about 20 percent of GDP or,
with regard to equity markets, own around 20 percent of outstanding equities. The level
of assets that would signify attainment of critical mass would also depend on the
presence of foreign institutional investors. A higher scale of domestic institutional
investors would be required for critical mass when international investors are not active
participants in the domestic market.
The importance of critical mass is obvious for countries that implemented
systemic reforms in the 1990s 8. Although the reform programs are promising and
pension funds are growing fast in all reforming countries, their total assets are mostly
less than 5 percent of GDP and their quantitative impact on the development of equity
markets is small. Even so, they have some qualitative impact in that they create a
demand for financial institutions that provide services to pension funds, such as
custodian firms and asset managers.
In Chile, the absence of critical mass manifests itself in a different way. The
Chilean pension funds have accumulated assets corresponding to 45 percent of GDP,
while all institutional investors, including pension funds, insurance companies, and
mutual funds, control resources equivalent to 65 percent of GDP.  As documented in
Walker and Lefort (1999), institutional investors gave a boost to the development of
bond markets, including corporate and bond markets, and the creation of rating agencies.
But their impact on the equity market was more subdued.
The Chilean pension funds invest about a quarter of their total assets in equities.
As the Chilean equity market has a total capitalization in the region of 95 percent of
x  The list  of countries  that implemented  systemic  pension  reforms  in the 1  990s includes  Argentina,
Bolivia,  Colombia,  El Salvador,  Mexico  and Uruguay  in Latin America  as well as Hungary,  Kazakhstan,
Latvia, and Poland  in Eastern  Europe  and Central  Asia. Other countries,  including  Bulgaria,  Costa  Rica,
Croatia and  Romania  passed  relevant  legislation  and plan to implement  their systemic  reforms  in the near
future.
9GDP,  the pension  funds own  collectively  somewhat  less than 10 percent of the Chilean
equity  market.  Adding the equities  held by other institutional  investors  does not raise
this total by much because  most mutual  funds are bond funds, while insurance
companies  also invest heavily  in debt instruments.  With about 10  to 12 percent  of the
equity  market,  the ability of Chilean  institutional  investors  to influence  market  practices
is constrained  and is not as large as that of UK and US institutional  investors,  which
own  over 50 percent of their respective  markets 9.
Another  manifestation  of critical  mass is in the value of market  trading. Chile
and South Africa are two countries  where  institutional  investors  are large but the value
of equity  trading  is low.  As shown  in Chart 1, the value of trading in both Chile and
South Africa increased  slightly  over the years, but did not experience  the explosion  that
characterized  the US and UK markets  (and most other equity  markets  around the world).
In Chile,  this is partly explained  by the young  age of pension  funds. Although  newly
created  pension  funds grow very fast as a result of the contractual  nature  of pension
saving,  they tend to adopt a "buy and hold" strategy  since they can rebalance  their
portfolios  by changing  the asset allocation  of new flows, without  the need to sell
existing  holdings. This is especially  the case  in markets  with a few "eligible"  equities.
However,  the Chilean  restrictions  on short-term  holdings  by foreign  investors  may also
have  been a factor,  since in Brazil  the existing  private  pension funds also hold no more
than 10 percent of the total equity  market,  but trading  volumes and market liquidity  are
much higher than in Chilel 0.
The Chilean  pension  funds  own collectively  more  than 30 percent of the equity  capital  of some
large  privatized  utilities.  Their  collective  corporate  influence  is much greater  in these  companies  and their
segments  of the market.
10  "Buy and hold"  strategies  were  also adopted  by US and UK pension  funds when  they first
diversified  into equities  in the early 1950s  (Vittas 1998b,  Chernow 1990).
10Market  Trading











1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Year
In South Africa the pension  funds have a much longer history  but until the
change of political regime  in 1994,  they  were forced  to invest heavily in local equities
by buying  out the stakes of departing  foreign  investors.  For most of the 1980s,  the
pension  funds followed a "buy and hold" strategy  and the value of trading  was very low.
Market  trading expanded  after 1994  when the economic  sanctions  against  South Africa
were lifted and foreign investors  returned  to South  African equities.  Pressured  by the
needs of international  investors  the local equity market  was restructured  and
modernized.  The value of trading  reached  31 percent of GDP in 1997,  up by a factor of
3 since 1993.  The South African  experience  highlights  the important  interaction  between
domestic  and international  institutional  investors.
Adoption of conducive  regulations.  Reaching  critical  mass is not sufficient  for
the realization  of the potential  market  benefits of pension  funds and other institutional
investors.  Adoption  of conducive  regulations  is a further  "impact"  precondition.  Several
countries  have large provident  funds or social security  corporations  but the imposition  of
11constraining regulations has limited their direct impact on capital market development.
Such regulations include a requirement to invest their resources in nonmarketable
government bonds or at most in marketable government bonds and bank deposits, with
very low limits imposed on equity holdings.
The best known examples are the national provident funds of Singapore and
Malaysia. Although these funds have avoided the fate of provident funds in African
countries, where high negative real rates of return have eroded the real value of fund
balances, they have failed to provide a direct stimulus to the development of domestic
securities markets. Other countries where pension institutions attained critical mass but
have suffered from the absence of conducive regulations include Cyprus, Egypt, India,
Jordan and Sri Lanka".
Singapore and Malaysia are interesting examples of the volatile impact of
international investors (Chart 2), especially when they are contrasted with the experience
of Chile and South Africa. While domestic institutional investors were forced to be
absent from the local equity markets, the value of trading exploded under the pressure of
growing international interest from much less than 25 percent of GDP in the 1  980s to
well over 150 percent in the 1990s. In the case of Malaysia the value of trading reached
nearly 250 percent of GDP in 1993, but fluctuated wildly after 1993 and fell to less than
40 percent in 1997 in the aftermath of the Asian crisis. The experience of Singapore was
similar, though less extreme. This underscores the benefits of a diverse investor base and
presence of strong domestic institutional investors alongside foreign institutions.
Most of the institutions  in the countries  listed  in this section  of the paper have  been given some
freedom  in recent  years  to invest  in equities  and other  marketable  securities.  In Singapore  and Malaysia,
affiliated  workers  have  been allowed  to invest directly  in approved  mutual  funds and  other assets  any
balances  in excess  of a stipulated  minimum  level.  These initiatives  represent  a welcome  change  from the
past policy  of using  these  institutions  as captive  sources  for  fnancing government  budgets,  but the new
approach  is too recent  to allow an assessment  of its impact  on capital  market  development.
12Market  Trading
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Pursuit of optimizing  policies.  The third "impact" precondition  concerns  the adoption  of
optimizing  behavior  by pension  funds. Pension funds in the Netherlands,  Switzerland
and some  other  continental  European  countries  are very large but have been constrained
over the years by quantitative  restrictions  on their asset allocations  (Davis 1998).  These
limited  their ability  to invest  in equities  and to that extent  their effect is similar  to that
discussed  under  the previous  section.  However,  an interesting  feature of continental
European  pension  funds  is that quantitative  restrictions  have  been non-binding,  at least
in the aggregate.  Their limited  involvement  in the domestic  equity  market  was due as
much  to the pursuit of conservative  investment  policies  that favored  fixed  income
securities  over equities  as to the quantitative  limits imposed  by the regulators.
In recent  years,  both the investment  regulations  have  been relaxed and the
pension  funds have changed  their asset allocation  strategies  in favor  of equities.  For
instance,  Swiss  pension  funds  have raised their equity  holdings  from less than 5 percent
in the mid-1980s  to nearly  20 percent in 1996 (Queisser  and Vittas 2000).  They own less
than 10 percent  of Swiss  equities.  These levels are far below those of pension  funds in
13the United Kingdom and the United States 2. The growth in the value of trading in the
Netherlands and Switzerland (Chart 3) reflects to some extent the growing equity
allocations of pension funds but is more likely the result of the growing integration of
European and global markets.
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The importance of optimizing policies is also underscored by the performance of
pension funds and other institutional investors in South Africa. Although they invest
heavily in equities, South African institutional investors have generally followed a "buy
and hold" strategy and have played a passive role in corporate affairs. The result has
been a less than stellar investment performance. The main explanation for the absence of
optimizing policies is the fact that institutional investors, and the asset managers they
hire, belong to the five conglomerate groups that dominate the South African economy
and securities markets. The recent entry of foreign investors and the process of
"unbundling" of the large groups that has started in recent years promise to lessen the
dominant role of financial conglomerates, allowing pension funds to seek higher returns
and exert greater influence in corporate affairs. The South African experience
12  A very  recent  change  in Switzerland  retains  quantitative  limits,  but allows  pension  funds  with
demonstrated  professional  management  to adopt the "prudent  expert"  approach.
14uiAerscores the risks inherent it,  the continuing growth of financial cenglomerates in
other parts of the world.
Prevalence ofpluralistic  structures. As in thc case ofi  critical rnxss, it -s lifficult
to be precise about what constitutes a pluralistic structure. Obviously, systems
dominLted by national provident frids  (as is the case in Malaysia, Sin ,pore  a  a  Sri
Lanka) or by one or two private pension funds (as is the case in Bolivia'; do nao have a
pluralistic structure. At the other end of the spectrum, counti ~e4.  with hunidrec  s and even
thousands of pension funds, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and
Switzerland, are characterized by a prevaleni pluralistic structure. But many countries
(e.g. Arge.. iiwa,  Chile, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mexico and Poland) have between 5
and 30 peiision funds and in these cases it is difficu't to sa) whether the institutional
structure is sufficiently diverse to ensure the benefitu3  of plu alisrn.
A pluralistic structure is important for stimulaLing  competition, cicouraging
innovation and promoting efficiency.  In most countries, the absence of competition
allows social security corporations and national provident funds that dominate local
pension systems to operate inefficiently, maintain poor records and suffer from long
delays in determining pension benefits for retiring workers and resolving disputes. In
securities markets, dominant institutions are exposed to other problems.
In Sri Lanka, the national provident fund has long been required to invest all its
resources in nontraded government securities, effectively loans to the government.
However, a recent decision to diversify into marketable securities, including equities, is
faced with the dilemma that the resources of the provident fund are much larger than the
total market capitalization of the Colombo Stock Exchange. Even a small reallocation of
assets in favor of equities could cause a large increase in prices. Even if the provident
fund invested in the market index, it could have a destabilizing effect. Such an effect
would of course be greater if the fund invested in individual companies. A dominant
institution would also be exposed to serious adverse price impact as market participants,
anticipating its investment decisions, could act against its interests.
The Social Security Corporation of Jordan, another dominant institutional
investor in its domestic markets, has long been concerned about the potential adverse
price impact of increasing its investments in equities. It has also been concerned about
strong criticism and second-guessing of its investment decisions by all kinds of external
observers, from parliamentarians to academics and journalists. These valid concerns
have inhibited the corporation in its investment policies and have resulted in an
extensive reverse maturity transformation, whereby nearly half its total long-term
resources have been placed in short-term bank deposits.
In countries where pluralistic structures prevail, large pension funds have been
able to change their asset allocations in a gradual but effective way, without much
second-guessing, raising political concerns or causing unavoidable adverse price
impacts. For instance, the pension funds of General Motors Corporation in the United
15States  and Imperial  Tobacco  in the United  Kingdom  implemented  major shifts in their
asset allocation  policies  in the late 1  940s  and early 1950s.
A pluralistic  structure  is also important  for ensuring  that corporate  governance
and control  do not end up either in a public sector  institution  or in relatively  few private
institutions.  It is further  instrumental  for encouraging  innovation  in asset allocation
policies. In the United  States and the United  Kingdom,  the gradual  move to indexed
portfolios  and the more recent growing  emphasis  on private equities  and enhanced
indexing  have all been facilitated  by the prevalence  of pluralistic  structures.
Given  the existence  of large scale economies  in record  keeping,  collection  of
contributions  and payment  of benefits,  there is a worldwide  trend toward increasing
market concentration,  especially  in countries  that rely on non-company  pension  plans.
One way  to preserve the benefits  of pluralism  while achieving  scale economies  in those
areas  where  they are important  is to separate  the asset management  function  and allow
or require  the use of a sufficient  number  of external  asset managers.  This is put forward
as a possible  option in Chile where the number  of independent  pension  funds has already
fallen  to 7, with the four largest  accounting  for more  than 80 percent of total assets
(Iglesias  1999).  It is also an approach  proposed  for dominant  public sector institutions  in
Egypt,  Jordan,  Sri Lanka and elsewhere  provided  the selection  of external  asset
managers  can be insulated from  political considerations  and effected  in an objective  and
equitable  manner.
7.  Other Forces of Long-Term Change
Before  concluding  this paper it may be useful  to make a number of corollary
observations.  As the experience  of many countries  in Europe  and Asia shows,  pension
funds (and domestic institutional investors more generally) are neither necessary
nor sufficient for the development of securities markets. This is not to deny their
large potential impact on capital market development and the dynamic interaction that is
likely to evolve between pension funds  and capital markets. But other forces, such as
advances  in technology,  deregulation,  privatization,  foreign  direct  investment,  and
especially,  regional  and global  integration,  may have  the same  impact.  In fact, in some
European  countries,  such as for instance  Greece,  it is likely  that integration  into the
Euroland  is not only stimulating  capital  market development  but may also both force
and facilitate  pension  reform  through  its imposed  restrictions  on fiscal deficits.  In such
countries  the link may be from capital  market development  to pension  reform  rather than
the other  way round.
It is also important  to note that at the global level,  the impact  of the investment
policies  of large  American and European  pension  funds and insurance  companies  may
be far greater  than that of small and slowly  growing  domestic  institutions.  A small
increase  in the asset allocation of these funds to foreign  markets  may have a very large
impact  on the functioning  of equity  markets of many smaller  economies.  This explains
16the relevance of globalization and international integration for many market
developments.
Realization of this important link is not, however, an argument for transferring
management of all the assets of domestic pension funds to an international asset
management company to be invested in the world index (as is vociferously argued by
some). Even though a substantial part of total resources should be intemationally
diversified and could be invested in this way, a large part ought to be directed toward the
domestic economy. The main reason for this would be to promote the development of
small firms and economic sectors that tend to be overlooked by global institutions.
8.  Pension Funds  and "Symbiotic"  Finance
Institutional investors, and especially pension funds, can play a key part in what
may be called "symbiotic" finance, i.e. the simultaneous presence of several important
elements of a modern financial system. In the first place, pension funds promote the
development of other institutional investors, such as insurance companies and mutual
funds. Insurance companies benefit from the imposition of compulsory term life and
disability insurance and later on from the purchase of annuities by retiring workers. In
Chile, the ratio of total assets of insurance companies to GDP increased by a factor of 15
since the implementation of pension reform in 1981. Mutual funds benefit by the
growing demand for efficient fund management and by an important demonstration
effect as workers become more familiar with the benefits of collective investments in
marketable securities.
Institutional investors promote the development of both equity and bond
markets, and they can play a central part in the development of mortgage finance
through mortgage bonds or mortgage securitization. Access to mortgage finance through
the security of their own house is often an important first step for new and small
entrepreneurs in obtaining business finance.
A more promising avenue is through the support that pension funds and other
institutional investors can provide to factoring, leasing and venture capital companies.
These financial intermediaries specialize in financing new and expanding small firms
and can effectively compete with commercial banks that tend to dominate the financial
systems of most developing countries. Institutional investors can support their
operations by investing in commercial paper, corporate bonds and equities issued by
them.
The efficient operation of factoring, leasing, venture capital and mortgage
finance requires a far-reaching modernization and strengthening of the legal
underpinnings of financial contracts. These include laws that facilitate the creation,
registration and liquidation of collateral security, the foreclosure of mortgages, the
repossession of assets and their disposal in second-hand markets, and viable exit options
through well functioning securities markets.
17It is important  to emphasize  at this juncture that the role that pension  funds  can
play in developing  domestic  financial  institutions  and domestic  sources  of finance  is not
an argunent for prohibiting  an international  diversification  of their assets. This is
especially  so for countries  where  the industrial,  utility and financial  sectors  are
increasingly  integrated  with global  markets through  strategic  ownership  by large foreign
groups.  Blanket  prohibition  of foreign  investments  would  then be tantamount  to forcing
pension  funds to invest in small companies  or in those inefficient  large local companies
that attract  no foreign  interest.  The most promising  approach,  especially  for smaller
countries,  would be to encourage  international  diversification  of the majority  of pension
fund assets,  but retain a significant  part for promoting  local financial  institutions  that
specialize  in those sectors  that are neglected  by the large multinational  financial  groups.
9.  Short-Term and Long-Term Beneficiaries of Pension Reform
As argued above, pension reform and the development of pension funds and
other  institutional  investors  is one of the longest of "long cuts" in development.  The
benefits  for workers  and  the economy  take long to materialize  but they last. An
instructive  way to appreciate  the long-term  nature of the reform  benefits is to ask who
are the main beneficiaries  in the short term.
Experience  from Latin  America  shows  that the first beneficiaries  are the various
"consultores",  all those who advise  governments  about the need and implications  of
pension  reform' 3. Then  come the "publicitores"' 4, the advertising  companies  and other
publicity  specialists  that  help pension  fund companies  in their advertising  campaigns.
Third in the list are the infamous  "promotores",  the selling  agents  that sign up
employers  and workers.  In Latin  America, selling  agents have acquired  notoriety
because of their role in encouraging  workers to switch  pension  funds  for no other
apparent  reason  but to generate  commission  income for themselves,  which  they then
partly share  with the switching  workers. Selling  agents have also played  a notorious  part
in the "mis-selling"  fiasco of personal  pension  plans in the United  Kingdom.
Fourth come  the "asseguradoras",  the insurance  companies  that, as noted
above, benefit from the provision  of term life and disability  insurance  and the sale of
annuities  to retiring  workers.  Fifth are the "administradoras",  the pension  fumd
management  companies.  These  incur heavy start-up  costs before the launching  of the
new system and during its first few years. In Chile,  the pension  fund management
companies  posted  losses for the first three years of the operation  of the new system but
over time they were able to recover  their capital outlays  and achieve  high returns  on
13  This  includes  not only  the numerous  Chilean  economists  that have  become  popular  travelers  in
Latin America  and other  parts of the world, but also the growing  anny of actuaries,  economists  and
pension  specialists  in North  America  and  Europe,  not to mention  those  working  for multilateral
institutions,  such as the World  Bank or the OECD.
14  1 understand  that the right  term is "publicistas".
18equity.  Last  come the "trabajadores",  who  truly benefit when they retire.  Their pension
benefits  are not only more  secure  but most likely  higher than what they would be under
an unreformed  system.  In the long  run, the workers  also benefit from the enhanced
efficiency  of securities  markets  and  the achievement  of higher economic  growth.
Recognizing  that workers  are the last group to reap  benefits from the reform  is
not a cynical  admission  of some  important  weakness  of the new systems  but rather a
pragmatic  and realistic assessment  of the allocation  of benefits of any reform  program.
Moreover,  such an allocation  is not uncommon.  For instance,  in the case  of any  type of
infrastructure  project (an airport,  a new road,  an electric  utility),  the first beneficiaries
would  be the consultants  who  prepare  the feasibility  studies,  followed  by the engineers
who draw  the blueprints  and then  the construction  companies  that build  the project:  But
the long-term  beneficiaries  are the residents  and workers  of the country  who reap  the
long-term  benefits from the services  offered  by the new project'5.
10.  Conclusions
The main conclusions  of this paper can be listed as a series of bullet points.
*  The basic rationale  of pension  funds is to provide  retirement  benefits.
*  Pension  funds and other institutional  investors  generate  long-term  contractual
savings  and stimulate  the development  of securities  markets.
*  They can act as a countervailing  force to existing commercial  and investment
banks,  stimulate  financial  innovation,  exert pressure  for greater  market  integrity
and modernized  trading  facilities,  strengthen  corporate  governance,  and
encourage  more  robust  financial  regulation.
*  The "feasibility"  preconditions  for successful  pension  reform are not as
demanding  as it is sometimes  assumed  while, in contrast,  the "impact"
preconditions  are more  onerous.
*  The most important  "feasibility"  precondition  is a strong  and lasting  commitment
of the authorities  to maintain  macrofinancial  stability,  to foster  a small  core of
solvent  and efficient  banks and insurance  companies,  and to create  an effective
regulatory  and supervisory  agency. Opening  the domestic  banking  and insurance
markets to foreign  participation  can easily fulfill  the second requirement.
is  The long-term  benefits  of systemic  pension  reform,  the large  positive  externalities  and  the
similarities  with  major infrastructure  projects  strongly  suggest  that  the transition  costs  of reform  programs
should,  in large part,  be financed  by issuing  debt  rather  than raising  taxes. This is, however,  a topic  for a
another  paper.
19*  The main "impact"  preconditions  include  the attainment  of critical  mass, the
adoption  of conducive  regulations,  the pursuit  of optimizing  policies,  and the
prevalence  of pluralistic  structures.
*  Pension  funds are neither necessary  nor sufficient  for capital  market
development.  Other  forces, such  as advances  in technology,  deregulation,
privatization,  foreign  direct investment,  and especially  regional  and global
integration,  may be equally important.
*  But if they are subject  to conducive  regulation,  adopt optimizing  policies,
operate in a pluralistic  structure,  and when they reach critical  mass, pension
funds can have a large impact  on both capital  market development  and economic
growth.
*  Pension  funds are critical  players  in "symbiotic"  finance,  the simultaneous  and
mutually  reinforcing  presence  of many important  elements of modem financial
systems.  They can support  the development  of factoring,  leasing  and venture
capital  companies,  all of which  specialize  in the financing  of new and expanding
small finns.
*  Financial  innovation,  technology  and globalization  allow developing  countries  to
adopt new instruments  faster,  although  institution  building is a long-tern
process.
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